BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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249. The Trial of Francis Powers

Francis Powers, the U-2 pilot, is expected to be put on trial by the Soviet Union about the end of June for "crimes against the state". This will be a major public show trial and will attract worldwide interest. Powers is expected to make a full confession of his "crimes", revealing that he was an intelligence agent of the United States Government and that he acted under orders to overfly the Soviet Union. He will, of course, be convicted, but then Khrushchev, in a gesture of magnanimity, might release Powers and allow him to return to the US. Powers may, while under Soviet control, turn down such an offer and elect to stay in the Soviet Union, accusing his employer of planning to take action against him when he returns. The whole proceedings will offer another platform for the Soviet Union to continue its virulent attacks against the US and President Eisenhower and to protest its basic desire for peace. 25X1C10b

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250. <u>Soviet Secrecy</u>

Secrecy in matters that are open in every democratic society is a characteristic feature of the Soviet police state. Particularly since the coexistence propaganda campaign was launched in international affairs, a new emphasis was put on internal controls obviously because the Soviet government feared the consequences that its policy of encouraging foreign visitors might bring. Travelers in 1959 reported stringent customs inspection. Some were detained for "misusing" their cameras. In addition, five more cities were listed as denied to foreign visitors. (See Addendum Sheet). Among the specific internal controls over the individual, unusual in free countries, the following deserve mention. As soon as a Soviet citizen reaches the age of 16, he must obtain an identity document from the police. He cannot leave his place of employment without a specific release which he must produce before being hired in another job. He cannot receive parcel mail addressed to him without showing his passport. Extended travel, although not formally forbidden, is controlled through the denial of lodging when the traveler cannot show either a vacation travel document (putevka) or an official duty travel document (komandirovka). Walking or riding near state borders is forbidden. In coastal areas only registered members of yachting clubs are entitled to possess sail or power boats. Personal possessions are also controlled. Maps and town plans below the scale of 1:6000000 are considered security information. Added to these specific controls over individuals there are many other surveillance and harrassment measures which the foreign traveler has come to associate with life in the Soviet Union. Among these one can mention censorship of printed matter and news dispatches, stringent customs inspections, areas closed to travel either temporarily or permanently, police searches of rooms, etc. In international affairs Soviet obsession with secrecy causes Soviet diplomats to look with extreme suspicion on any disarmament plan the moment inspection is mentioned. It is of interest that Soviet citizens show a growing reluctance to submit to all this secrecy and control. Recently, for example, a young professor who wanted to marry a student protested to the papers against attempted interference by the school authorities (See <u>Komsomolskaya Pravda,</u> 13 April 1960). 25X1C10b

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251. Possibility of Iraq-UAR Rapprochement

Not since a short period following the Iraqi revolution of July 1958 have there been so many signs that strained relations between Iraq and the UAR may conceivably be patched up. Relations were already bad before the revolt, largely because Iraq was the only Arab country which was a member of the Baghdad Pact. After the revolt there were signs that there might be a move toward some form of union or federation with the UAR, or, at least, that the two states might draw closer. But relations again deteriorated with the fall of Premier Qasim's Deputy Premier, Colonel Abdal Salam Arif, who favored Iraq's rapprochement with Nasir; the Mosul military uprising in early 1959; and the abortive attempt last fall on Qasim's life (all of which were attributed, at least in part, by the Qasim regime to UAR machinations). Vitriolic propaganda poured from the presses and the radios of both countries. The UAR has recently lessened the intensity of this propaganda. The Iraqis, for their part, have now agreed to pay up 500,000 Iraqi dinars ($1,400,000) in back payments to the Arab League. (The League has generally been regarded, at least in some Arab countries, as merely an arm of the UAR Foreign Office.) The League's Secretary General, Abdel Khalek Hassouna has announced that he will soon visit Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hashem Jawwad, has likewise announced for his part that he will attend the Arab Foreign Ministers meeting in Beirut in July. In an additional exhibition of solidarity for Arab causes, Iraq joined the UAR in the recent boycotting of American ships in retaliation for the earlier boycotting in New York of the UAR ship S. S. Cleopatra. Moreover, it should be noted that, in recent months, Qasim's treatment of the Communists has been somewhat sterner than it was in the months following the 1958 revolution when his dallying with them gave the impression that Iraq was on the verge of becoming a Communist satellite.

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FOR NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN AUDIENCES

252. Communist-Socialist Relations

Most of the mature Socialist Parties--combined in the Socialist International--pursue anti-Communist policies, reject Communist "united front" offers, resist Communist infiltration into labor unions, etc. Some leftist Socialist Parties, however, as most recently demonstrated by the Japanese Socialists' campaign against the Japanese-US security treaty and against the visit of President Eisenhower, and some other Asian and Latin American Socialist groups have come under Communist influence (in varying degrees) and are playing Moscow's and Peking's game in crucial areas of the free world. This may be in some cases the result of covert Communist penetration, but it is far more often primarily due to ill-defined "radicalism", especially in countries with limited democratic experience; and to inadequate understanding of the true nature of communism and the impossibility of "fair play" between democratic Socialist and Communist parties. 25X1C10b

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253. Coexistence and the West

Despite the Summit impasse and the fact that Khrushchev's foreign policy continues to encounter resistance from China, from a number of the satellites, and, very possibly, from elements within his own party, the Soviet leader continues to adhere to his "moderate" program of the "peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems". In essence, Khrushchev has replaced the frontal assault tactics of the Stalinist era with the more subtle and diversified--but no less aggressive--methods of "peaceful coexistence". By so doing, the Soviet leader is buying time--for the recuperation of Soviet society from the ills of the Stalinist era, for its regeneration and re-dedication to Communist goals, and for the disintegration and collapse of the Western alliance. Thus, in Asia, Khrushchev is willing for the present, to settle for the neutrality of India, Burma, and Indonesia, although striving to shape this neutrality into a pro-Soviet and anti-Western mold, and has opposed the more direct tactics favored by the Chinese Communists in these same areas. In France, where Khrushchev sees in de Gaulle a potential instrument for disrupting the Western alliance, Khrushchev has gone so far in his "soft" approach as to make flattering references to the French leader and to endorse the latter's Algerian policy, a course of action which has embarrassed the French Communist Party. During a period when the Soviet Union is embarked on a program of deliberately minimizing differences, confusing issues and using all sorts of semantic camouflage, much of what it offers for public consumption will resemble, on the surface, what the West is advocating. Therefore, it will be incumbent on us to look beyond the euphemism of the day, to discover to what objective phenomena the words and slogans relate and to expose the Communist meaning and the Communist objective. For example, during a speech in France, Khrushchev recalled the proverb about a bad peace being preferable to a good war: "This," he said, "is true, but to my mind it is insufficient. A good peace is better than a bad peace and we should orient ourselves toward the former. We must strive to transform peaceful coexistence from the mere absence of war into active cooperation among all states in the spheres of economy, culture and science." Such a statement might have originated with any Western critic of peaceful coexistence. Obviously, however, we are not talking about the same thing when we use the words "peace", "cooperation", etc. In Communist parlance these terms all have very specific meanings. They relate to ideological concepts which hold that man is only an element in a whole ("society", "state", "party", or some other abstraction); that it is this abstraction--rather than the individual--which counts and that the behavior of the individual is explained by the whole rather than vice versa; that man's course of action in life can be deduced from knowledge of the goals of the "objective processes of history" and therefore must be the same for all those who understand these processes; that all means--no matter how stupid, ugly or vicious--which contribute to the fulfillment of the "objective cosmic purposes" are justifiable and therefore cannot "ultimately" be stupid, ugly or vicious since they are "necessary" and "inevitable". Such a doctrine provides a ready-made ideological frame for all those seeking an ideological justification for despotism and oppression and diverges markedly from our own. However, this does not necessarily preclude the development of a constructive relationship. We encounter the same sort of communications barrier in our intercourse with Arabs, Indians, Chinese or any other non-Western civilization. It does mean, however,

253. (Cont.)

that mutual understanding becomes a difficult process requiring infinite patience. Thus, for the moment, there is no real possibility of "ideological coexistence" with the Soviet Union. It cannot reasonably be expected at this stage of our relationship. Rather, the best we can hope for at the present is that good will and patient effort will gradually attenuate the principal points of friction until such time as Soviet society evolves to the point where a more positive relationship is feasible.

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High Jinks and High Jumps

NOTES ON SOVIET SPORT

By Henry W. Morton

(Soviet SURVEY - A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends, January - March 1960)
(p. 75 - 81)

The importance of sport in the life of the Soviet citizen has not received proper emphasis or recognition, not even by those whose main concern is the study and analysis of Soviet life. Whereas literature, music, the theatre, the cinema, etc. receive continuing treatment by Sovietologists, the complex appeals of sport and the participation and partisanship it engenders in millions of Soviet citizens has remained relatively unexplored and unpublicised.

Still fresh in my mind is one memorable Sunday of last August which I spent in one of the most magnificent sport complexes in the world, in the Lushniki section of Moscow. It is situated along the Moskva river and was completed in 1956. It has many sports buildings of which the Lenin Central Stadium, a massive rotund structure, the largest in Europe, is the most impressive. Smaller in scale, but neatly structured, are many arenas, sports arenas and practice fields which include among others, an arena for hockey, seating 12,000 spectators, a giant swimming pool with concrete stands, a children's stadium, basketball and volleyball courts, etc.

It was a beautiful, warm summer day and a huge crowd had gathered early, choking the major and minor arteries leading from the Metro station to the Central Stadium, hustling and bustling in their characteristic fashion. Along the pathways and girding the major and minor stadia were hundreds of booths selling a great variety of goods: clothing, glassware, scarves, shoes, electrical appliances, books (the bookstall had the slogan 'Everyone should have his own library'). Many had come to Lushniki to shop and browse and the familiar queues formed, particularly in front of the food counters which dished out large quantities of red cavier and sliced sausages on open bread with beer and fruit soda.

Sport, however, is the main attraction at Lushniki, which because of its varied facilities is able to present a sports carnival practically every Sunday. The day's programme began in the morning with an international tennis match, held in the small arena, with players from Denmark, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union participating.

The major attraction of the day was reserved for the spacious Central Stadium and tickets ranging from three to ten rubles were sold at a brisk pace. The programme was divided into two parts. It started at three, with a dual track meet (the second and final day) which matched Soviet athletes against those of East Germany. The latter trailed their Soviet counterparts, in true satellite fashion, across the finish line to the quiet and polite approval of the spectators.

The stands were packed to capacity for the championship soccer match (not so for the track meet), which pitted Spartak of Moscow against Zenit of Leningrad. It was early evening by then, six-thirty to be exact, but the sky was still fairly bright and blue. The match left a memorable imprint on my mind. A tenseness and a feeling of excitement had taken hold of the crowd. The fans watched the moves of the players, as they scrambled for the ball, with the greatest attention, and the more excitable shouted words of advice, encouragement and derision at favourites and opponents. Whenever a goal was scored a great number of coloured balloons, bought for the purpose, were joyfully released and drifted serenely skyward while the fierce competition continued below. An inevitable part of the setting, perhaps more noticeable to the foreigner, was the solitary, gigantic banner, white on red, which covered an entire side of the stadium and proclaimed: GLORY TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR.

At the end of the contest, which (to almost everyone's satisfaction) was won by the local Spartak team, the huge crowd filed out of the stadium. Although a water ballet went on as scheduled, most of the people hurried off to the Metro. They were flanked by a cordon of militia (police) and soldiers who were there to see that the thousands advanced to the station in an even-flowing line. Once below, however, with trains hurtling into the station in rapid succession, all semblance of order ceased. When the train doors were thrown open, everyone rushed to enter, there followed an animated pushing and crushing which lasted over three-quarters of an hour. It was done in the highest spirits and good humor, and only a few timid souls stood back aghast at the spectacle before them.

Before Lushniki was built, major sports competitions took place, as they still do, at the Dinamo stadium of Moscow, which seats more than seventy thousand people. On that same Sunday, a soccer match was also in progress there, as were soccer matches in six additional stadia in various parts of Moscow. In fact, throughout the Soviet Union, a varied sports programme is maintained, as every large city has its own sports structures. The largest of these have become tourist sights (in addition to Lushniki and Dinamo stadia in Moscow, Kirov stadium in Leningrad and Khrushchev stadium in Kiev are two other examples) and are shown with a great sense of pride and achievement.

One should not, however, get the impression that all sports facilities are of the latest model or in the best of conditions, as the Soviet Union is still a land of marked contrasts. The two major physical culture institutes in the country, in Moscow and in Leningrad, are both housed in old buildings which are now being repaired. Having toured the Moscow Institute (which, incidentally, was named after Stalin in 1935, although no picture of the late dictator is visible today), I was surprised at the poor condition of the playing field and unimpressed by the gymnasium, although the classrooms were excellently kept, with elaborate pictorial displays of Soviet and pre-revolutionary Russian sport history and busts of Lenin. F.I. Samoukov, the assistant director of the Moscow Institute, hoped that at the end of the seven-year plan, the institute would be housed in a new building and that it would have a stadium seating fifty thousand people.

Sport cuts deeply into the fabric of Soviet society, affecting millions, and spectator sports are only one aspect of the total sports programme. More important to the Party is the enlisting of millions into active sports participation. Sport kollektivy (groups) are found everywhere. There are 200,000 of

them in factories, offices, schools, collective and state farms, in labour reserve units, in the armed forces and in the Security Police. These are set up according to specific conditions and rules (as trade union and non-trade union sports societies) and receive their overall direction from the Union of Sports Societies and Organisations (formerly the All-Union Committee of Physical Culture and Sport).

The latest figures released on sport claim that more than twenty four and a half million persons actively engage in different sports.[1] At present there is a great drive to increase the number of active sports participants and improve their general mastery. Control figures announced in 1959 (yes, sports too are planned), call for fifty million sports men, thirty thousand Masters of Sports (there were 13,520 as of 1 January 1959), and seventeen million athletes who will have achieved one of the six sport categories below the master level, by the end of the seven-year plan in 1965.[2] This drive also has its special slogan, which is 'One Plus Two'. Every physical culturist is obliged, not only to improve his sport mastery, but to draw a minimum of two persons into the physical culture movement.

Even if an individual is not a member of a sports group, some aspect of physical culture may still be introduced into his daily life. In the morning, if so inclined, he can participate in the daily morning exercises (to the rhythmic chant of raz, dva, tri, chetyre) which are cheerfully broadcast over the radio; or peruse Sovetskii Sport the central sports paper, which is popular because of its readability and appears six times a week. (Sovetskii Sport is only one of eighteen sports periodicals published in the USSR.)

Once at work, he may find himself doing callisthenics if he is one of five million employed in one of twelve thousand enterprises which are listed in the programme of on-the-job callisthenics.[3] This programme, which the sports administration is trying to extend, consists of a series of exercises carried on for ten minute periods once or twice a day during work time. It is an effort to stimulate tired muscles and thereby raise labour productivity.

In addition, sports pavilions and pictorial displays of sport at Soviet exhibitions are commonplace, as is the fact that important roadways are habitually blocked off to stage mass relays, bicycle races, and other sporting events.

Impressive indeed were the monster sport demonstrations which had been held yearly to celebrate Physical Culture Day and which are still used today to dramatise important sports events, as the opening of the 1959 Spartakiad, a gigantic all-union pre-Olympic try-out which is held every four years and precedes the Olympic games by one year.

[1] Soviet Weekly, 20 August 1959, p. 10

[2] Sovetskii Sport, 27 February 1959, p.2; 18 August 1959, p. 1.

[3] Sovetskii Sport, 18 April 1959, p. 2.

The spectacle in Moscow, always the most elaborate and ornate of all the Republics, in which thousands participate, is often reviewed by the Soviet leaders and by representatives from the fifteen republics. In what appears to be a never-ending production number (it may last five hours), the demonstrators stream by with banners unfurled proclaiming: UNDYING LOYALTY TO THE PARTY, TO PEACE, TO MEET THE TARGETS OF THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN, TO ACHIEVE NEW SPORTS RECORDS. The spectacle changes from young men standing on speeding motorcycles striking heroic poses, to hundreds of gymnasts, who in seconds set up acrobatic equipment and perform their exercises, to a gigantic flota, held up by hundreds, which turns out to be a basketball court on which a game is in progress.

Foreign observers, who have witnessed such events, find if difficult to put their astonished reactions in words, and are even less able to estimate the amount of time and money that it necessitates to plan and stage a spectacle worthy of several DeMilles.[4]

The Soviet sports programme did not spring full-blown into Russian life in the 1950s when Soviet sport successes gained world notice. Nor was the programme developed because of a strong popular demand for sports.

Viewing sport in the broad sociological context of twentieth century life, one might suggest that mass sports and organised athletic activity, in the form of clubs, societies, leagues, is the by-product of modern industrial society. Urbanisation, increase in population, technological advancement, leisure time, modern transportation and communication (making inter-area and international competition possible), education, and physical education in particular, improved equipment and sports structures, etc., have made mass sports possible, desirable, and to some extent necessary.

This analysis, however, does not hold true for sport in a closed society. Here the deus ex machina for sport, as for anything else, is the Party. Consequently any programme, particularly such an ambitious one as sport, which affects millions, must have active Party sponsorship, and as a result Soviet sport is an integrated part of the Soviet milieu, and probably reflects Soviet life to a much larger extent than is appreciated by the outside world, which shows interest only in the Soviet performances at international competitions.

The reasons for conducting sport on a mass scale are many and go far beyond the traditional uses of sport to which we in the West are accustomed. The Soviet sports programme, which dates back to the early years of the revolution (and has some important antecedents in Tsarist Russia) has always had definite tasks and areas assigned to it by the Party. These were explicitly stated and detailed in a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1939, which stated:

> Physical culture must be considered not only from the point of view of physical training and health but as one aspect of the cultural, economic, and military training (target shooting, etc.) of young people, and also as

[4] For further descriptions see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (N.Y., 1948), p. 461; Avery Brundage, "What I Saw During Three Weeks Behind the Iron Curtain." Speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, 7 February 1955 (mimeographed).

> one of the methods of training the masses (insofar as physical culture develops will-power, teamwork, persistence, composure and other valuable qualities), and also as a means of rallying the broad masses of workers and peasants to the various Party, Soviet, and trade union organisations through which the working and peasant masses are drawn into social and political life....Physical culture must play an integral part in the general political and cultural training and education of the masses.[5]

These fundamental tasks assigned to sport have remained unchanged and have been buttressed by subsequent Party resolutions and pronouncements, and new assignments, particularly the demand to beat and surpass bourgeois sports records, first announced circa 1934, have since been added.

Soviet sport, therefore, is a 'transmission belt' and has the mission to carry out specific Party designs and purposes of a varied nature. It cannot develop at its own speed nor does it necessarily follow popular demand.

The basic goals of Soviet sport, although never fully realised, are many.

Physical culture and sports should help to raise labour productivity. One frequently comes across statements like the following:

> Athletes are obliged to raise the productivity of labour by all means at their disposal, to perform exemplary work at their jobs, and at the same time help their friends achieve victories of production.[6]

Not only is sport considered essential for the physical fitness and mental alertness of the worker, but in addition, physical exercises should inculcate 'in young people a love of labour'.[7] Physical fitness has become the patriotic obligation of every citizen; it should help him perform his job with joy and greater efficiency and thus become 'an active builder of communism'.

Towards this end, too, on-the-job callisthenics is greatly encouraged by the Party. Kommunist recently bemoaned the fact that, 'unfortunately there are still many factories and plants where the introduction of callisthenics is proceeding at a snail's pace', and that many republics 'still continue to underestimate the importance of callisthenics as a means of improving health and raising labour productivity'.[8]

Secondly, physical culture is an essential factor in para-military training. All must learn to bear arms in case 'reactionary forces' will not permit the transition to communism to take place peacefully. 'Socialist society has an important task before it--to train the workers, especially the young generation, to defend socialism in case of military attack'.[9]

5 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, 13 July 1925. Reprinted in Kalendar Spravochnik Fizkulturnika na 1939 God (Moscow, 1939), p.5.
6 Sovetskii Sport, 25 March 1951, p.1.
7 Pravda, 19 July 1954, p. 1.
8 Kommunist, 1959, 13.
9 G.I. Kukushkin (ed.), Teoriia Fizicheskovo Vospitaniia (Moscow, 1953), p.42.

Soviet physical culture has a long history as a subsidiary arm of the military. In 1931, the twin aims of higher labour productivity and military preparedness were incorporated into a mass physical fitness programme, appropriately called, 'Ready for Labour and Defence' (Gotov k Trudu i Oborone, usually abbreviated to GTO).

Since its inception, fifty million persons have passed through the GTO system. In addition to providing a mass physical culture base, the primary purpose of the GTO system is to attract the physically able--pupils in schools, students in higher education, workers and peasants, and in particular members of sports and societies--to partake in a programme designed, in addition to its doctrinal purpose, to provide the country with soldier-workers, militarily capable and in good health.

Since training in military weapons and the fostering of a martial spirit are primary objects, the system of GTO contains such test categories (for all its divisions and for both sexes) as grenade-throwing for distance, rifle-shooting for accuracy, cross-country skiing with a time limit, and the scaling of physical obstacles. Gliding, parachute-jumping, and other 'sports' of military value are greatly encouraged.

In 1958, to help celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Komsomol, a nation-wide spartakiad in applied military sports was held, supervised by DOSAAF (all-Union Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force and Navy) in close cooperation with the sports administration. It received broad coverage in the Komsomol press, which stressed the importance of military preparedness of youth. Disarmament proposals notwithstanding, there has been no indication that the emphasis on the military application of sports is being reduced, or that it will be reduced in the immediate future.

Sport is used by the Party as a lever of social control. It offers a wonderful opportunity to exploit the genuine enthusiasm of its citizens and at the same time enables the Party to control and to channel leisure-time activities towards Party-inspired goals. All sporting activities are under strict Party supervision and are directed towards specific goals. Sports societies, for example, can be, and have been abolished when it is felt that they no longer serve Party purposes, and the spontaneous organisation of a sports group is impossible. All sports organisations are formed according to 'model statues' to insure no deviation from the norm, and the selection of personnel is also strictly supervised.

Consequently membership in sports societies carries with it at least nominal allegiance and some obligation to the Party and the regime. Naturally this does not prevent people from joining; regularly held propaganda lectures can be passively ignored, and other controls, omni-present in Soviet society, are accepted as normal. In fact, the individual interested in participating in sports will be most eager to join that society which offers him the best equipment and facilities. (One former Soviet citizen recalled that in his town every youngster wanted to join Dinamo--it is sponsored by the Security Police--despite parental objections, because its facilities were vastly superior to that of any other society.

As increased leisure becomes available to the Soviet citizen, it will be more difficult to control the activities of millions and use them to the advantage of the regime. This is probably one of the reasons behind the most recent drive to treble membership of sports associations by the end of the seven-year plan.

Physical culture and sport is to play an important part in 'transforming' man. As an integral part of Communist education, they must help to train the coming generation 'physically and morally' in communist ideals.[10] As a result, the 'new Soviet man' will boast good health, physical fitness, and stamina. But this is not enough. Participating in sports should also nurture positive character traits: a spirit of collectivism, courage, will-power, the determination to win, patience, endurance, and discipline.[11]

Sport, basking in the glories of Soviet socialism, thus assumes new qualities and positive functions non-existent in other historical epochs. All the evil features of bourgeois sport (the argument runs that under capitalism sports divert the worker from the class struggle, arouse base instincts, and develop individualism, egoism, chauvinism, misanthropy and other traits of bourgeois morality)[12] are negated and transformed into positive functions under Soviet rule.[13]

In the optimistic gallery of socialist realism, Soviet citizens of all ages are painted gaily participating in sports under the benovolent direction of the Party, Komsomol, and trade unions. Rosy-cheeked, sport-loving Mishas and Natashas from all parts of the Soviet Union are seen engaging in honest, correct competitions on the highest cultural plane, maintaining at all times courtesy on the playing fields, and respect for their adversaries and referees. They extend the hand of indestructible friendship to one another, cementing the ties among the multi-nationalities of the USSR.

Soviet sportsmen (the fable continues), healthy and smiling, united in a national fervour, promote their countries' goals by competing abroad--active champions of peace and friendship, strengthening cultural ties with all nations, exuding Soviet warmth, fairness, and genial generosity (while at the same time scoring innumerable triumphs), and, always, unfailingly demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet socialist culture.

Enhancing the prestige of the USSR at home and abroad is indeed an essential consideration. Every victory, athletic achievement, and new world record supports the Bolshevik contention that 'the triumph of our athletes...is proof of the superiority of the Soviet socialist culture over the rottenness of the culture of capitalist countries'. [14]

Participation and partisanship in sport undoubtedly excite strong feelings, and support for a Soviet team engaging in international competition arouses strong sentiments of national pride, a sense of satisfaction that in this area (as well as others) Russia no longer has to take a second place to the West. Such sentiments are of course consonant with Party aims, if not always expressed in precisely ideological terms, and the Soviet citizen is encouraged to identify team loyalty with state loyalty (a phenomen not unknown elsewhere).

Since 1952, when Soviet athletes gained world prominence with an excellent showing in their initial Olympic appearance, they have earned world respect in

10 P.A. Rudik, Fizicheskoe Vospitanie Sovetskoi Molodezhi (Moscow, 1953) p.9.
11 Sovetskii Sport, 18 April 1959, p. 4.
12 Rudik, op. cit, p. 10
13 I.M. Koriakovski (ed.), Teoriia Fizicheskovo Vospitaniia (Moscow, 1954), p.9.
14 Iu. Mataev, Fizicheskaia Kultura i Sport v SSSR (Moscow, 1955), p. 26.

sports. This has inflated Soviet prestige abroad, and the advantage so gained has been systematically exploited by the great increase in exchanges of sports delegations (in the past ten years 1,300 foreign sports delegations and more than 18,000 foreign athletes visited the Soviet Union, and in the same period 20,000 Soviet athletes travelled abroad.)[15]

Sport devotees in the West have been concerned with the changing trend in world sports. But (quite naturally) they are asking such questions as, 'How can we beat the Russians?' 'Are Soviet athletes professionals and do they thus have an unfair advantage?' 'Is the Soviet Union using sport to help it win the cold war?' Questions of this nature can only yield superficial answers unless the dynamics of Soviet sport are fully understood; more inquiries need to be made into the role of sport in Soviet society and how it affects and influences the life of Soviet citizens.

[15] Kommunist, loc cit.

HOW TO WIN A TRACK MEET - THE SOVIET WAY

(U.S. News and World Report, 8 August 1958)

Who really won that track meet between American and Soviet athletes in Moscow? It depends on how you add the scores.

U.S. and Russia agreed in advance on a scoring system to keep totals for men and women separate. U.S. men won.

So Russia ignored the agreement, lumped all scores together and promptly announced a Soviet victory.

MOSCOW

Even in sports, Americans are finding that the Soviet Union has a strange way with the rules of the game.

Before they agreed to enter track and field teams for competition against Soviet athletes, officials of the U.S. Amateur Athletic Union got a signed agreement from Russian officials.

It stipulated that men's and women's events would be tabulated separately--not combined. This agreement was considered necessary, inasmuch as American women do not take a mass interest in high jumps, shot-puts or javelin throws.

The meet was held July 27-28. Team scores showed this:

For Men	
U.S. - 126 points	Soviet Union - 109 points

For Women	
Soviet Union - 63 points	U.S. - 44 points

Promptly, Soviet officials ran up the totals on the scoreboard, combining the results for men and women: Russia - 172 points. U.S. - 170 points.

From 30,000 Russian throats went up the cheer: "We won!"

All around the world, headlines blazoned: "Soviet Athletes Beat Americans."

And all that U.S. athletic officials could do was to haul out their signed agreement, look at it and feel sorry.

Relatively few American women go in for track and field. Those who do usually receive little prestige and no financial reward. George Eastment, coach of the American teams, said last week: "Why, I don't think we've got more than 200 women in training over the whole country."

For Russia: regimented sports. Russia, however, has a program of regimented sports for the masses --women as well as men. Twenty million persons belong to Soviet sports clubs. Well-muscled women, along with men, are singled out for special training by the tens of thousands. Top stars get all kinds of incentives--better food, plush living quarters and easy jobs.

Americans are quick to admit that this program is paying off in athletic achievements and prestige for the Soviet Union.

In 1956, Russia claimed the unofficial Olympic title by a small margin over the U.S. At that time, Russia amassed most of its points in women's events and in such lesser sports as weight lifting and gymnastics. But now Soviet athletes are gaining ground in men's track and field, too. Recently a Soviet rowing crew beat the U.S. entry in a British regatta.

U.S. women do well. Even so, American women made a far better showing than anticipated in last week's competition. They won four of 10 events--including the shot-put, usually conceded to Russia's amazons.

In men's events, the U.S. furnished the big hero of the whole competition. He is Rafer Johnson, a U.C.L.A. student who broke the world's decathlon record by a startling margin. His performance was hailed by the Russian coach as "the greatest to occur in the world in any sport."

Next day, the official newspaper "Pravda" carried the banner: "U.S.S.R. Sportsmen Conquer." This newspaper quoted Dan Ferris, honorary secretary of the Amateur Athletic Union, as saying: "The Soviet team beat us through their fine performance in the pole vault and the men's high jump."

Soviet athletes already are preparing for another "victory" in the return meet between the two countries next year in Philadelphia.

Official Soviet photographers thoroughly filmed the performances of top U.S. athletes. They took 75 minutes of film, alone, of U.S. shot-putting star, Parry O'Brien. American stars were questioned closely about techniques and training methods.

Same scoring in 1959? Beyond that, Russian officials -- far from apologizing for their violation of their agreement for this year's competition--are demanding that the 1959 match use combined scores of men's and women's teams so that the Soviet Union, once again, can capitalize on the brawn of its women athletes.

Mr. Eastment has rejected this demand. Men and women, he says, will compete on a "separate but equal" basis as is customary in most countries.

As most officials see it, that make much difference to the Russians. They can send home their own version of the score. And the U.S. is learning that even on the playing field, the Soviet Union plays by its own rules. (END)

SPORT AS A SOVIET TOOL

By John N. Washburn

(FOREIGN AFFAIRS (An American Quarterly Review) April 1956, Vol. 34, No. 3, pages 490-499)

The leaders of Soviet Russia have always considered sports to be a matter of primary importance to the state and have made their position clear in numerous Communist Party decrees and Pravda editorials. They have stated that there can be no "sport for sport's sake," that hunters, for example, must not merely look for game but consider themselves explorers with obligations to Soviet society. Their preoccupation with the utilitarian and socio-political aspects of sport is reflected in their definition of the term fizkultura (physical culture) which the July 13, 1925, decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party interprets as follows:

> Physical culture must be considered not only from the standpoint of physical education and health and as an aspect of the cultural, economic and military training of youth (the sport of rifle marksmanship and others), but also as one of the methods of educating the masses (in as much as physical culture develops will power and builds up endurance, teamwork, resourcefulness and other valuable qualities), and in addition, as a means of rallying the broad masses of workers and peasants around the various Party, soviet, and trade union organizations, through which the masses of workers and peasants are to be drawn into social and political activity.

Thus, sports can have no independent existence in the U.S.S.R. and are merely a means to an end--the consolidation of state power through mass training and indoctrination.

Prior to World War II the Communist Party in Soviet Russia utilized physical culture and sport primarily to build the country's defense potential and facilitate other domestic purposes; but in the past ten years these have played an increasingly important role in furthering the foreign policy objectives set forth by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. At the end of 1946 the U.S.S.R. was represented in only two international athletic bodies, but between 1946 and 1955 it joined 25 more. Official recognition of the Soviet Olympic Committee in May 1951 made it possible for the U.S.S.R. to participate in the 1952 Olympic Games. In 1955 Moscow permitted the international exchange of athletic delegations between the Soviet Union and the outside world to reach its postwar peak, with 187 foreign athletic teams coming to the U.S.S.R. to play against Soviet teams while 162 Soviet athletic teams went abroad to compete. The government has sought both to provide maximum competitive experience for Soviet athletic teams in preparation for the 1956 Olympic Games and to increase the number of teams dispatched to distant lands for political purposes. An example is the "Lokomotiv" soccer team that traveled to Indonesia, Burma and India. It played against an Indian team in Calcutta on December 1, the day after the huge mass meeting held there in honor of the touring Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev.

A considerable body of Soviet Marxist dogma concerning bourgeois and proletarian sport has been formulated by Bolshevik theoreticians. Soviet Marxists maintain that under capitalism the bourgeoisie hypocritically proclaims the non-political nature of sport while doing its utmost to distract toilers from the class struggle and to instill in them the base instincts which warmongers with criminal aims may utilize to advantage. To support their claim they invariably cite the following passage from an article by Maxim Gorky on the nature of sports in bourgeois lands:

> Sport there has one simple and clear purpose: to make man even more stupid than he is. There the cry "Down with reason, extinguish thought!" resounds louder and louder. This is a cry of fear and despair. Thought must be blinded and rendered impotent in order that there may be substituted for the power of reason unquestioning faith in the authority of class state and the church; reason must be blinded so that it will not perceive the light that has been lit in the U.S.S.R. In bourgeois states they utilize sport to produce cannon fodder....

After the start of the Korean war in 1950 Gorky's reference to "cannon fodder" was repeatedly quoted to "prove" that Uncle Sam was a warmonger using sport to train American youth for war.

This purportedly authentic picture of the political and martial nature of bourgeois sport is then contrasted with Soviet sport, whose avowed purpose is to destroy everything old and sordid that obstructs the growth of the new and pure proletarian culture. Under the benign supervision of the Communist Party, the Soviet government and wise leaders like Comrade Stalin--"the best friend of the physical-culturists"--sport is alleged to have been placed at the service of the masses, to have increased their cultural growth and their well-being, and to have developed their spiritual and physical capabilities. Bolshevik theoreticians laud Soviet sport for dedicating itself to the cause of peace, conveniently forgetting the once popular slogans--"The Red Army--The Real School of Physical Culture" and "Physical Culturists--The Red Army's Reserve." They also overlook embarrassing martial spectacles in the field of sports such as fencing with carbines to which rubber bayonets have been attached, still a regular event at all U.S.S.R. fencing championships.

Since sport is a matter of primary importance to the state all athletes up to and including those with the title of Honored Master of Sport are subject to a rigorous code of conduct both in training and in the course of championship competition. Suspension and loss of the honorary Master of Sport title will result from "misdemeanors incompatible with the calling of a Soviet athlete." G. Novak, holder of many world records in weight lifting since 1945, was stripped of his Honored Master of Sport title in 1952 for "amoral conduct." Another example of the Spartan approach was to be seen at the 1954 U.S.S.R. outdoor tennis championships, in which a semi-finalist was judged to have defaulted his match for appearing on the court five minutes after the designated hour. From this our young players will learn the lesson of punctuality, commented Sovietskii Sport. Chess players are also vulnerable. Several Grand Masters participating in the 1953 U.S.S.R. chess championships were subjected to sharp criticism for having been too prone to settle for "toothless ties."

An apolitical attitude is not tolerated in Soviet athletes. No sport can be outside the realm of politics. The code of political conduct for chess players, as announced in an official decree issued three years ago, requires Soviet Grand Masters and Masters to work systematically to improve their comprehension of Marxist ideology in addition to perfecting their techniques in chess. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find leading Soviet chess players manifesting their political orthodoxy by delivering anti-American tirades like that of Grand Master A.A. Kotov at the fourth All-Union Conference of Peace Supporters in Moscow in 1952.

The highest governmental body dealing with Soviet athletic policy is the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport. Successor to the All-Union Council of Physical Culture, it is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. From his headquarters in Moscow, the chairman for the past ten years, N. Romanov, directs the Union Republic Committees, which in turn control City Committees (of which the most prominent are those of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi and Minsk). The All-Union Committee maintains direct supervision over 15 institutes and 38 "technicums" of physical culture as well as several institutes for scientific research in physical culture. Within both the All-Union and Union Republic Committees are so-called special sections, comprising a cadre section and a secret section, staffed by the M.V.D. agents who handle security checks and recruit informers among athletes.

Through these special sections the M.V.D. can assert substantial pressure on the All-Union and Union Republic Committees. Its leverage derives primarily from the great power wielded by the M.V.D.'s own Dynamo Athletic Club, oldest and most influential in the Soviet Union. This nation-wide organization of the secret police and organs of state security controls approximately 120 stadia and operates an extensive network of stores selling athletic equipment. When the physical culture movement was revitalized under the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dated December 27, 1948, M.V.D. Colonel General Apollonov exercised fully as much authority as the chairman of the All-Union Committee. However, since the demise of L.P. Beria, the power of the M.V.D. in physical culture and sports has been somewhat reduced. In this connection it is significant that the fine hockey teams of the Air Force and the Central House of the Soviet Army were unexpectedly combined into a single team representing the Central Sports Club of the Ministry of Defense, which then humbled the Moscow Dynamo team in the 1955 U.S.S.R. ice hockey championships.

Another very important agency engaged in implementing athletic policy directives is the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth, often termed the "soul of mass sport". Its central committee is credited with drawing up the comprehensive plan establishing a minimum level of general, all-round physical development for Soviet workers as part of the expanded physical culture program called for by Stalin at the Sixteenth Party Congress. The plan's official title is the "All-Union Physical-Culture Complex" but it is popularly known as the G.T.O., whose initials stand for "Ready for Work and for Defense." The comprehensive G.T.O. plan developed in the early thirties comprises three sets of standards for Soviet citizens aged 14 to 40, both male and female. The original norms were made more exacting by specific government decrees in 1939 and 1954. The basic mission of the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth is to draw the youth of the land into physical culture groups called "collectives," whose members are given only a limited amount of time to pass the G.T.O. athletic tests in order that quarterly or annual G.T.O. quotas may be fulfilled according to plan.

The principal measure of athletic proficiency in the Soviet Union is the Single All-Union Athletic Classification System. In 45 recognized sports, from auto racing to checkers, five levels of proficiency have been generally established, starting at the bottom with Class C (the so-called "third category") and proceeding upward through Class B and Class A to the coveted Master of Sport category, and finally to the title of Honored Master of Sport. (In most sports there are also three junior categories.) The All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport sets the standards for each category of the Single Classification System. It has raised them twice in recent years. To qualify for a category rating under the Single Classification System a Soviet athlete must first pass the tests in one of the three sets of standards established by the G.T.O. plan. Before being awarded the Master of Sport title, for example, one must pass the advanced level G.T.O. tests with the grade of "excellent."

The G.T.O. plan and the Single Classification System reflect the two underlying principles of Soviet athletics--massovost (mass-ness) and masterstvo (proficiency). A broad base of mass participation in physical culture must exist before the skill of individual athletes can be developed on a national basis--this has been the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for more than three decades. Massovost is held to be primary, while masterstvo derives from it. Mikhail Kalinin, former chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., explained the primacy of massovost in these simple terms:

> In our country physical culture is sport for the people, in our country millions participate in the physical culture movement. And it is obvious that talented athletes will sooner be found among these millions than among thousands, and that it is easier to find talented athletes among thousands than among hundreds.

The fact that the Soviet Union is internationally prominent in sports in which it has a mass base (chess, gymnastics, rifle marksmanship, etc.), but woefully weak in sports lacking any mass participation in the U.S.S.R. (tennis, figure skating, fencing, etc.), points up the importance of massovost.

One of the principal agencies for promoting massovost is the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which has primary responsibility for establishing physical culture collectives in industrial and commercial enterprises and for recruiting production workers and office employees for these collectives. To this end, orders from the Central Council are transmitted to Union Republic, area and regional councils and on down to local councils and on down to local councils and to factory and plant councils at the production site. In actual practice this chain of command is surprisingly weak: Pravda revealed on July 21, 1951, that in over two years officials of the Central Council had not set foot in the large Torpedo Athletic Club at the Stalin Auto Works in Moscow. Trade unions first became active in the physical culture movement in 1935, when the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party permitted unions in the Moscow area to establish their own athletic clubs. Today the Central Councils of 30 unions are operating athletic clubs throughout the country. Assigned to the individual factories and plants are physical culture organizers who must get the assigned quota of their factory's labor force into sufficiently good physical condition to pass the G.T.O. requirements. To achieve his goal the fizorg (physical culture organizer) often makes use of the device known as "socialist competition," challenging the fizorg of another factory to a contest in producing the assigned quota of parachute jumpers or rifle marksmen, for example, in the shortest possible time.

In accordance with specific provisions of the 1948 decree, increased publicity has been given to the physical culture movement through the press, radio, television and films. "All-Union Day of the Physical-Culturists," which falls on a Sunday in either July or August, is celebrated with more and more fanfare and publicity each year. Considerable excitement accompanied the announcement that a tremendous drive would be launched to discover new athletic talent in rural Russia by means of a series of local and regional competitions in rural areas, followed by rural-urban competitions in major cities and towns. The winners in these competitions will qualify for the so-called "Spartakiad of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.," a mass pre-Olympic tryout scheduled for July and August of 1956 in a gigantic new stadium now under construction on the outskirts of Moscow. There will be competitions in 21 sports in which nearly ten thousand picked athletes representing all the Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. will be entered.

In order to put the massovost principle into effect a large and expanding physical plant and an adequate supply of athletic equipment are essential. The state budget for public health, which includes appropriations for physical culture and sport as well as for sanitation and hygiene, rose more than 12 billion rubles between 1952 and 1956, reaching a total of 35 billion rubles this year. Millions of rubles have gone into additions to the Soviet athletic plant: 400 stadia have been built since 1945 and the U.S.S.R. now has over a thousand; eight institutes and eleven "technicums" of physical culture have been added since 1941, raising the number to 15 and 38 respectively. While these figures indicate an appreciable growth in the physical plant, they give no idea of the extent to which demand for adequate athletic facilities has exceeded supply. The winter resort patterned after Davos and St. Moritz built near Alma-Ata to provide speed skaters with ideal conditions for breaking world records is definitely atypical and is restricted to Soviet skaters of championship calibre. Athletic equipment, even in the stores operated by the Dynamo Athletic Club, continues to be in short supply, a situation resulting not only from insufficient output and the inferior quality of goods produced but especially from inefficient distribution and marketing of athletic equipment. However, the shortage of sporting goods does not affect outstanding Soviet athletes; the state provides them with the best equipment made, whether Soviet or foreign.

As the center of the world Communist conspiracy, the Soviet Union has not forgotten that sports can prove to be of great use as a weapon in the class struggle. The K.S.I. (Red Sport International) was founded in Moscow in 1921 to "train physical-culturists for the class struggle." Although it no longer functions as the Comintern's athletic affiliate charged with combatting S.A.S.I. (Sozialistische Arbeiter Sportinternationale), the athletic organization affilitated with the Second (Socialist) International, agents trained by the K.S.I. are still at work trying to penetrate the national sections of S.A.S.I. in Western Europe. As a result of systematic infiltration, French Communists gained effective control over the F.S.G.T. (Federation Sportive et Gymnastique du Travail). Faced with a fait accompli the French Socialists in the F.S.G.T. withdrew and formed the U.S.T. (Union Sportive Travailliste), which represents the ideals of Socialist Leo LaGrange, France's first Minister of Sports and Recreation as a member of Leon Blum's cabinet. Although subsidized by the French government to the extent of 3,000,000 francs in 1955, the U.S.T. is still much weaker than its rival, which has ample Communist Party funds to draw on for such purposes as publishing a weekly newspaper and an illustrated magazine, and organizing costly propaganda spectacles like the annual cross-country race sponsored by the French Communist daily, L'Humanite.

Another aspect of Soviet sports that gives Americans pause is the policy of direct state subsidization of athletes of championship calibre. This practice was most actively promoted from 1934 to 1938 by I.I. Kharchenko, chairman of the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport, and by N.K. Antipov, his predecessor. In return for extensive material aid athletes were obliged to help train additional cadres of athletic instructors as well as perfect their own particular skills. Such coaching work was held not to violate the athlete's amateur standing. The arrangement, as Antipov outlined it in 1934, was as follows:

> We must have a talk with each Master Instructor, clarify his material position, assist him, and give him the sort of job that will bring benefits to the physical culture organization and will give him the opportunity of engaging in systematic private training under excellent conditions. Now is the time to move from general talk to concrete activity....
>
> Our instructor, by bourgeois concepts, is a professional, of course. We have thousands of such people and we shall have even more. How can there even be a question about allowing our instructors to enter competitions? In our country an instructor is just as much an athlete as anybody else.

This state-sponsored practice of removing potential champions from farm or factory to sinecures in the field of physical culture was carried to extremes in the period 1936-1938. According to Krasnyi Sport, several million rubles were spent on athletic subsidization in the Moscow area alone in 1938. Through devious channels much of the subsidization money reached the pockets of pseudo-athletes. Consequently, in 1939 it was decreed that future subsidies would go only to athletes certified as outstanding by the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport. These athletes served as the nucleus of the expanded postwar sports program, and a number of the older and more experienced ones were appointed to fill the newly established posts of State Coach in each major sport.

In prewar days the state admittedly provided its best athletes not only with jobs and money but also with privileges and priorities in respect to living quarters, food supplies and vacations at resorts on the Black Sea Coast. In the postwar period there have been occasional references to athletes holding sinecures and stories about athletes who sought to hold two or three positions simultaneously, thus subjecting themselves to severe criticism for sovmestitelstvo--the Russian term for multiple sinecures. Today such sinecures are skillfully camouflaged and never publicized. A very common practice is to provide athletes with a commission in the armed forces or M.V.D. that will serve as a "cover" for their full-time athletic activities. Olympic champion Emil Zatopek, the phenomenal Czech whose only duty as an officer in the Czech army is running, has his counterpart in the Soviet Army--Vsevolod Bobrov. Bobrov is the best hockey player in the U.S.S.R. today. Since he was recruited in Omsk ten years ago, he has had a brilliant athletic career playing under the auspices of the Central House of the Soviet Army. Athletes like Bobrov readily accept any army or M.V.D. commissions in order to secure greater political and economic security for themselves and their families and relatives.

A striking feature of the postwar expansion program in physical culture was the cash bonus system benefiting athletes who turned in record-breaking performances and who placed first, second or third in U.S.S.R. championships in individual sports. The first part of Pravda's announcement (October 22, 1945) giving details of the new bonus system read as follows:

In order to stimulate the further growth of athletic proficiency the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. has given permission to the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport to give out cash awards for outstanding performances. Thus, for example, an award ranging from 15,000 to 25,000 rubles will be given for establishing a U.S.S.R. record that surpasses the world record, and from 5,000 to 15,000 rubles will be given for establishing a U.S.S.R. record.

This cash bonus system, one of the least subtle features of Soviet professionalism or "state amateurism," was put on a clandestine basis long before the U.S.S.R. submitted its official application for admission to the International Olympic Committee. Although at the meeting of the International Olympic Committee held in Vienna early in May 1951 the Executive Committee questioned the amateur status of Soviet athletes, the Russian delegates replied that this practice had been discontinued and that henceforth the U.S.S.R. would abide by international amateur standards. The I.O.C., taking the Russians at their word, promptly voted 31 to 0, with three members abstaining, for the admission of the Soviet Olympic Committee. During a visit to Moscow in the summer of 1954, Mr. Avery Brundage, then President of the International Olympic Committee, again broached the subject of the genuineness of Soviet amateurism. N. Romanov, chairman of the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport, assured him his suspicions were groundless.

Soviet athletes participated in Olympic competition for the first time at the 1952 Games in Helsinki. Although they made a very creditable showing, their failure to win the unofficial team title caused Moscow to manipulate mass media behind the Iron Curtain in such a way as to create the impression that the Soviet athletes had triumphed over all. The fiction became a reality at the Seventh Winter Olympics held this year in Italy. The spectacular success of the Russians there will heighten interest in the track and field events of the Sixteenth Olympiad, to be held in Melbourne from November 22 to December 8. Although competition is between individuals, the Soviet Union's fanatical desire for national supremacy on the athletic field has served to place undue emphasis on team scores. We may be certain that a Soviet victory at Melbourne this year would be counted a major triumph in the Cold War.

At the foot of Mt. Kronion in the peaceful Olympia, the Alpheus and Kladeos rivers flow past the silent ruins of ancient Greek temples and altars. It was from this spot that the man who in 1896 revived the Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, expressed the hope that "l'Olympisme peut constituer une ecole de noblesse et de purete morales autante que d'endurance et d'energie physiques." It would be difficult to find a spirit more alien to de Coubertin's ideals of moral purity and nobility than the Soviet concept of sport as an element of state power and control, a means of ideological indoctrination, a tool at the disposal of the army and the secret police, a source of propaganda, and as a weapon of class warfare for international Communism.

THE POLITICS OF SPORTS

By.Henry W. Morton

(The New Leader, 4 April 1960, pages 16-17)

The triumph of the United States hockey team at the Winter Olympics last month came as a pleasant and unexpected surprise. To the Soviet squad and to the Soviet sport fan it was a stunning blow. Only last November, when the Brockton Hockey Team, U.S. amateur champions, toured the Soviet Union as part of the Soviet-U.S. sport exchange program, it lost all five games, the first three by the unappealing scores of 12-3, 17-1 and 17-0. The team wound up its trip with the unfortunate record of seven goals scored, 63 goals scored against.

How, then, was it possible for the U.S. to be crowned Olympic champion in hockey when only a few months before its squad was repeatedly walloped by its chief opponent? The explanation is relatively simple. Once every four years we assemble our best athletic forces under an Olympic banner. Between Olympic appearances, however, in many sports we are overcome by indifference and lassitude toward international competition. (Track and field is of the few exceptions.) [sic]

Apparently we feel no anxiety that American prestige is needlessly weakened when we field inferior teams for foreign competition--inferior often not because we lack top-notch athletes but because we lack planning and coordination among responsible sport officials and athletes, who, like the apathetic public, are politically unaware. Our losses, particularly to Soviet teams, by far transcend the area of sports and have a political influence on a sports-conscious world public.

The Brockton massacre is a case in point. It occurred when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were extending their exchange program for an additional two years. The U.S. agreed to continue bilateral track meets and to compete against Russia in weight lifting, basketball, gymnastics, swimming, junior table tennis and hockey. Little attention was given in the press to the trouncing we received and consequently few Americans were aware of it. What did it matter that a handful of players who led Brockton to the American championship in 1959 went to Moscow? Most of the top U.S. hockey players needed to form an all-star squad were unavailable for one reason or another. Yet our team was met by the best the Soviet Union had to offer--the cream of the most professional "amateur" players in the world.

Earlier in 1959 the United States became the laughing stock of the international basketball world when it send a third-rate team to the world basketball championships in Santiago, Chile, in January-February 1959. We were badly beaten by the Soviet team and also lost to Brazil. In reporting our loss to the Soviet squad, the New York Times correspondent wrote: "Sports pages throughout Latin America and from Paris to Peiping and from Manila to Cairo

carried this headline today: 'Russia 62, United States 37'. For the masses of sports followers who weigh international prestige by such results there was no footnote to explain that the United States was represented not at full strength by an improvised and injury-ridden Air Force team."

Only the fact that the Soviet team refused to play against Nationalist China and was therefore disqualified beclouded the issue and prevented the USSR from walking off with the honors. But this did not prevent the leftist newspaper, Ultima Hora, from happily proclaiming, "When it comes to shooting at moon or at a basket the United States cannot keep up with Russia."

Why did we not send a representative team to Santiago? The blame rests on the colleges and clubs who could not be bothered either to make the trip or to send their best players at the height of the domestic basketball season, and on the officials who countenanced such action.

The success of Russian athletes has inflated Soviet prestige at home and abroad and has conferred great legitimacy on a regime which in many areas has not won full acceptance. According to Soviet statistics, Soviet athletes in the past decade have set approximately 700 world sport records.* In 1948 Soviet athletes held only 18 world records and U.S. athletes held 56 in track and field, cycling, shooting, swimming and weight-lifting. At present the balance has shifted to 81 world records for the Soviet Union and 52 for the United States.

Soviet propaganda repeatedly boasts of Soviet sports achievements. A few months ago the important Party journal, Kommunist, declared: "Soviet athletes have recently administered defeats to their chief rivals in athletics--the Americans--in track and field, wrestling, chess, skating, skiing and the pentathlon, i.e., in almost all the forms of sport widely cultivated in the United States of America." Kommunist failed to point out that the Soviet Union has never competed against us in such popular American sports as baseball, football, golf and bowling, or that our men in track and field and in basketball have almost always beaten their Soviet counterparts. But in other respects the list is correct and quite impressive.

As far as sport exchanges are concerned, we are really far behind. The Soviet Union maintains contact with sports organizations in 64 countries. In the last decade 1,300 foreign sport delegations and more than 18,000 foreign athletes have visited the USSR, and in the same period more than 20,000 Soviet athletes have traveled abroad to various countries. Yet up to now we have treated our own sports exchange program with the Soviets lightly. When the Soviet all-star basketball team arrived in the U.S. late in November 1959, reciprocating a visit by an American squad, only 7,000 people turned out to see its opening game in Madison Square Garden. Why were there so few spectators (the Garden's capacity is 18,000) at what would seem to be a sure-fire attraction?

First, there was a dearth of publicity, fatal in this amusement capital where so many attractions compete for an audience. The chief fault, however, rested with the attraction itself. The Soviet team faced a squad of Americans composed solely of players from the Industrial League, completely unknown to New Yorkers. A full house could easily have been guaranteed, had it been advertised

*Underlining by Reviewer

that Yan Kruminish, the seven-foot-three Soviet center, would be teamed against Wilt Chamberlain. Should the promoters have wanted to agitate the amateur-vs.-professional controversy, equally successful results could have been achieved if a college all-star squad, led by Cincinnati's Big "O", Oscar Robertson, had provided the opposition. No sport columnist, to my knowledge, asked why the Soviet team faced only Industrial League competition as it played out its schedule, losing four out of six, in almost total obscurity.

In general, lack of press coverage of internationally significant sports events stems from our sports parochialism. Only one newspaper, the New York Times, has a full-time correspondent covering European sports. Occasionally sports writers imbue important sports results with political significance, but almost never the political analysts, in whose province it rightly belongs.

What policy ought we follow? Our main concern should be to arrest our downfall slide. We must rule out all hope of regaining world hegemony in sports. The Russians will continue to win the unofficial score title in the Olympic Games and will triumph in the majority of international competitions because the Communist party subsidizes a gigantic sports program which now enlists more than 24 million active participants, and which has among its Seven-Year Plan objectives in sports (to be reached in 1965) the goal of doubling that number.

Soviet leaders have made propaganda capital of the excellent scores made by their athletes. No Russian team is sent abroad unless adequate and extensive preparations have been made. Athletes are rigorously trained, often at special camp sites, and selected with great care.

Consequently, if a Soviet team loses, or does not win by the score expected, a searching effort is made to determine the cause. This "search" is a peculiar Soviet neurosis, as is the concept of Soviet victory, which is attributed solely to the superiority of the Soviet system.

The present Soviet superiority may, in a matter of years, be challenged by Red China, which will, for the first time, be the sole Chinese representative in the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome,*despite U.S. State Department objections to the International Olympic Committee.

The Chinese have already embarked on a formidable sports program. They claim that at least 130,000,000 persons (about one-fifth of the population) are active in athletic training and competition, that they have broken at least 11 world sports records in 1959, and that 2,500 new stadia and 4,000 new sports centers have been built since they seized power. This includes the 80,000 capacity Workers Stadium in Peking, erected in 1959 to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the revolution and closely resembling the even more massive Lenin Central Stadium in Moscow, built in 1956. With such energy expended on sports it will be only a matter of decades, or less, before Red China makes its mark in international sports.

As a nation we apparently do not have the desire, nor do we feel the necessity, to spend huge sums of money in competing with the Communists. Nor do we have an integrated and coordinated sports system. Many Americans apparently share President Eisenhower's views, expressed at his February 3, 1960

*Underlining by Reviewer

press conference, that it is not necessary to keep up with the Russians in all areas, including sports, and that the U.S. could achieve a greater tempo only "if you take our country and make it into an armed camp and regiment it."

Whether one agrees with this view or not does not mean that Government leaders, agencies responsible for our foreign policy and the various sports federations and associations should not coordinate their efforts to effect a better image of America abroad. U.S. prestige will not necessarily suffer if we act responsibly by sending representative teams to foreign competitions, even if they should lose. We are in danger of losing respect if we continue to insult foreign athletes and fans by sending make-shift, second-rate teams, showing that we do not take our obligations seriously. Independent sports bodies and Government agencies cannot do it alone. We need public awareness and pressure from interested individuals and groups.

RED AMATEURS ARE PROS

For '56 Olympics, Soviets regiment sports as weapons of state

By Yuri A. Rastvorov

(Former Soviet Secret Agent)

(LIFE Magazine, June 6, 1955, pages 93-106)

In the 17 months since my flight from the Russian intelligence service I have studied international sports with particular interest from the viewpoint of a fan and a former athlete in the Soviet Union. I was at once amazed by the gulf between the U.S. and Soviet attitudes toward sports. I believe that if Americans do not learn just how complete this difference is before next year's Olympic games, they may be in for some rude shocks. Americans have to realize that such terms as "amateur" and "voluntary" are totally irrelevant in the U.S.S.R. Soviet teams are not "organized"; they are assembled as parts of a great state machine. Soviet teams do not "play" at their sports; they work at them.

In the past two years the world has watched Soviet athletes make a stunning impact on international sports. Soviet teams and competitors have traveled to more than 15 countries, while from Moscow has come a lavish stream of invitations to foreign groups ranging from a British soccer club to a Japanese wrestling team. Most of those who have accepted these Russian challenges have met crushing defeats: in 1954, for instance, the Russians beat the Canadians at hockey, the British at soccer, the Norwegians at skating. Last July a crew of Soviet oarsmen carried away Britain's Grand Challenge Cup at the Henley regatta.

Soviet participation in such international competition has little to do with "coexistence," certainly even less to do with recreation or sportsmanship for its own sake. The objective in this field was laid down in a 1948 decree, and it is exactly the same as in all others: "world supremacy."

As a member of the Russian generation that grew up after the revolution and later as a member of the Soviet intelligence service, I had very full opportunities to observe the total regimentation of Soviet sports. As a youth I was trained in the military skills that were compulsory "sports" requirements for young Soviet citizens. As a young man I learned of the flagrant special privileges that are given Soviet sports stars, and later in a Siberian prison colony I saw what happened to athletes who were suspected of abusing those privileges. I learned that no Soviet team is sent into foreign competition unless it is practically certain of winning, although this may involve bribing judges and referees. Finally as an espionage agent in Japan (LIFE, Nov. 29, Dec. 6, Dec. 13, 1954) I saw how the machinery of Soviet intelligence is constantly at work evaluating foreign athletic capabilities just as it evaluates foreign military capabilities.

All Soviet sports activities are under the direct control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party through the Committee of Sport of the Council

of Ministers. Pressure from the top is constant. In 1948 the Politburo instantly removed Nicolai Romanov as chairman of the Committee of Sport after an abrupt Party-line switch decreeing new emphasis on Western-style athletics. He was replaced by one Colonel General Apollonov, an MVD officer whose background for the job had been the command of the Border Guard Directorate. Presumably the Central Committee felt that this tough MVD soldier could be counted on to inculcate proper discipline in all lower echelons.

Below the committee level are the great Soviet sports "clubs" or unions that actually operate the peculiar system of recruiting athletes and putting them on the equivalents of their payrolls. Soviet propaganda persistently shouts that "there are no professional athletes in the U.S.S.R." In the sense that no one can fill out an entry on a questionnaire with the words "Occupation: Athlete," this is true. Each of the great clubs hires and retains promising players through its own unique system of coercions and rewards. The stars end up as full-time athletes, although each of them nominally carries on some other more mundane activity.

Tough Talent Scouts

These ostensible "jobs" as well as the recruiting methods and emoluments depend upon what branch of the Soviet state runs the athletic club. The most famous and powerful club, the Dynamo, with approximately 500,000 members in units that cover cities throughout the U.S.S.R., is the organization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Committee of State Security--the secret police. These groups have had first priority in recruiting men for their services throughout the U.S.S.R., and the Dynamo has made full use of this in picking out athletes, who may be given officers' commissions although they almost never appear in uniform.

Because it has been almost impossible for an athlete to turn down a bid to play for the secret police, the army-navy clubs, known as TsDSA (for Central House of the Soviet Army) usually have had to be content with second place as far as talent is concerned. Like the secret services, though, they can offer comfortable officers' commissions. Two star TsDSA soccer players named Bobrov and Grinin held the rank of captain or major in the Soviet army when I last saw them play in 1950.

The remaining big clubs are forced to offer more material inducements. The Spartak, which represents the state-owned commercial enterprises, trade unions and other government bureaus, is in an excellent position to dispense goods as well as money. The Torpedo team of the ZIS auto works makes it possible for players to own luxurious cars, thus conferring inestimable social prestige. The captain of the Torpedo soccer team is a Spaniard named Gomez who came to the U.S.S.R. during the Spanish civil war and is carried on the payroll as an "automotive engineer." Soccer became such a preoccupation around the ZIS plant a few years ago that the manager had to be fired, one of the reasons reportedly being because he was giving so much time to his soccer team and so little to his assembly lines.

In the manager's case this was a mistake, but the individual player is just as much a full-time athlete as any member of an American big league baseball team. His rewards are comparably handsome. A member of the winning

team in the Soviet equivalent of the World Series--the All-Union Soccer Championship--receives a bonus of 5,000 rubles ($1,250) and a share of the gate receipts. The player who has received the coveted title of Master of Sport and the handsome medal that goes with it receives a special monthly check. Should he be picked as the outstanding player of the year in his sport, he will get about 2,000 rubles more a month. Should he be rated among the top 10 players in his field, he will get perhaps 800 or 1,000 rubles. All of this, plus his pay from the job he nominally holds, enables him to live as well as a top bureaucrat.

Secret carrots, public sticks

Although these facts are well known to most Soviet citizens, for purposes of outside consumption the government still attempts to keep the payments secret. A top-ranking woman tennis player once told me that when she stopped by to pick up her monthly check she and her fellow athletes were required to sign a paper that threatened prosecution and punishment should they reveal this income.

Should a player's performance fall off in a crucial game, should he fail to absorb the indoctrination that is given him constantly by the team's party organizer, should he even fall open to charges of "conceit," disgrace and punishment are swift and spectacular. He is considered guilty of antistate activity.

Yuri Tukalov, the young single-sculls champion who blemished the Soviet rowing triumph at Henley by letting himself be beaten by a Yugoslav, was assailed in the press for his "spoiled attitude, weak will and lack of perseverence." After a TsDSA soccer team made a dismal showing against some almost unknown Czech teams in 1948, its managers and captain were hauled before a central committee commission and told that any repetition of the performance would mean a "sad end" for the team's coach and party organizer. Another TsDSA soccer team that was beaten by the Yugoslavs in the 1952 Olympics was immediately recalled to Moscow, the team dissolved and its managers accused of a "political crime."

During a 1948 assignment to the Khabarovsk penal area in Siberia, I caught a glimpse of the famous Starostin brothers who built up the great Spartak soccer team of the 1930s and are still known as "the fathers of Soviet soccer." Shipped out to Khabarovsk in the purges of the late 1930s, the Starostins were, when I saw them, employed as trainers for the MVD's local Dynamo soccer team. The Khabarovsk commandant told me, "You don't have to go to Moscow to see the best actors, musicians or soccer players. We have them all right here, and it doesn't cost a ruble to see them perform."

Although recent Soviet victories in such sports as rowing and skating and feverish Soviet training for such others as basketball and volleyball indicate just how completely Moscow hopes to dominate every event everywhere, soccer is still the top Soviet sport.

In addition to being the most popular sport in the Soviet Union, where almost every village, factory and military unit has a team, soccer has vast propaganda value because it is the favorite spectator sport of the Western European workingman. In England, France and Italy crowds of as many as 100,000 often gather to watch important soccer matches.

As far back as the 1930s the Soviets began to realize how much prestige they could build with winning soccer teams and they began to compete with a few foreign teams. These early encounters convinced them that their skill did not match that of the Westerners, and in any case Stalin's isolationist policy did not encourage such contacts. During World War II most sports were completely curtailed, and it was not until well afterward that the Soviets began to try in earnest to manage their soccer campaign like a well-run military operation to provide propaganda material at home and abroad.

Camouflaged all-stars

Nowadays no Soviet team meets a foreign one until the latter has been carefully evaluated by Soviet intelligence. The Soviet group, which usually plays under the name of one of the big clubs, is usually an all-star aggregation assembled from the best players of all the best teams. Sometimes even this careful planning has failed to pay off, especially in matches with satellite teams. Such fiascos have caused a good deal of grief for those who run Soviet sports and a good deal of amusement among spectators such as myself.

In 1949 the top-ranking Hungarian Vashash soccer team was invited to Moscow to meet what was billed as "a typical amateur team of factory workers"--the Torpedoe of the ZIS plant. Actually this team had been most carefully made up of top Soviet soccer stars, headed by the TsDSA's captain, Grinin.

I watched the first game of the series. Our players as well as the spectators were considerably puzzled by the courteous Hungarians, one of whom, after accidentally shoving a Soviet player, apologized and extended his hand--which was ignored. The Hungarians' soccer tactics baffled our men even more and our "typical amateurs" lost the game.

Afterward I met the wife of a sports official who knew General Apollonov, then serving as chairman of the Committee of Sport. According to her he turned progressively more pale as the game went on, and when it became clear that his Torpedos couldn't win, he walked out of the stadium. For the next couple of days he took to his bed.

Steps were immediately taken to make up for the defeat. Another team, made up of a whole new set of stars, was hastily assembled to meet the Hungarians under the Dynamo banner. At the second game, which I also watched, the Hungarians inexplicably failed to put in their own top star and generally played terrible soccer. The resulting Soviet victory was not only hailed wildly in the Moscow press but was made the subject of a full-length motion picture, which contained no mention of the Torpedos' earlier defeat.

Occasionally the spectators as well as the opposing teams get out of hand--incidents that are also unreported. In 1947 there was a championship play-off between the armed forces' TsDSA team and the Dynamos. As usual, public sentiment was against the Dynamos because of their secret police connection and as usual the lowest two or three rows in the stands were completely filled with MVD Internal Troops and policemen to keep the 80,000 spectators from getting out of hand. As the close game went on, the crowd became increasingly tense. After the TsDSA had scored its final winning point the spectators swarmed onto the field, shoving aside the cordon of guards. Several policemen who tried to stop the stampede were mauled, to the general satisfaction of the crowd. At the [illegible] by Internal Troops.

The vicissitudes of Vasily

Such fracases seldom become so violent, but they are not uncommon at Soviet sporting events, which provide one of the few outlets for popular emotions. Another one that I recall took place at a hockey game during the brief sports promotion career of Vasily Stalin, son of the then dictator. About 1948 Vasily decided that his position as an air force general did not of itself give him enough prestige, so he decided to dip a finger into Soviet sports. He went about this in a completely straightforward way, browbeating sports officials by invoking his father's name and bribing all good players he could lay his hands on. Among the sports his new air force club became interested in was hockey, which has become increasingly popular in the U.S.S.R. since the war. For his hockey team he stole two Spartak stars named Novikov and Zigmund. The air force group did so well that at the end of the season it met Spartak for the national championship. The moment Novikov, Zigmund and their teammates appeared on the rink there were wild yells of "Traitors! Swine!" from the Spartak fans, who were greatly in the majority and who presently unleashed a hail of potatoes on young Stalin's men. When the Spartak players came out they were feeling equally bloodthirsty, and soon there was a wild melee on the ice in which Novikov was badly beaten up.

Vasily Stalin's teams, like himself, have now dropped from sight. Presumably they have been reabsorbed into those of the other armed services.

Far below the level of the huge and well-publicized sports clubs, the armed services play a constant role in the sports training of every Soviet youth. As a youngster I went through all of the prescribed steps in a sports program that has as its objective the training of every young Soviet citizen in those basic muscular arts that will make him useful as a soldier. In my school years I had to qualify in such "sports" as cross-country skiing, rifle marksmanship and hand-grenade throwing in order to be eligible for the GTO (Ready for Labor and Defense) certificate that all youthful athletes supposedly hope for.

Through my father, an officer in the army recruiting service, I became a member of the army's TsDSA sports club. Because I was on several of its teams, my army orders for the Finnish front in 1940 were canceled. Even in this period those who showed athletic promise often were given direct commissions as lieutenants, allowed to skip their basic training and permitted to live at home instead of in army barracks.

With the Nazi invasion almost all sports activities came to an abrupt halt, but in 1943 those useful in military training were revived and stressed harder than ever. One young man I knew, who had to spend almost all of his time at the sedentary occupation of studying foreign languages, was forced to take part in a cross-country skiing competition. At the finish line he dropped dead of exhaustion. A few such incidents brought a little moderation into the program.

After the war the emphasis on sports, especially those having military usefulness, was stepped up among the young by means of a whole new series of awards for every conceivable specialty. My only advanced award was the GTO second-degree certificate, which I won as a tennis player but which can also be purchased for 30 or 40 rubles from clerical employes in the offices of the Co[illegible]

As a member of the MVD I played tennis on the Dynamo's splendid indoor courts in Moscow. Had I been a star player the Dynamo club would no doubt have seen to it that I got some sort of sinecure so that I could devote my full time to the game.

Soviet tennis has advanced hardly at all since the days in the late 30s when the great Frenchman Henri Cochet was brought over to teach and publicize the game. As the purges of the period gained in ferocity, Cochet was presently accused of being a French intelligence agent and deported. Several of the Russians closest to him were convicted of espionage and liquidated. Today Cochet's surviving pupils, most of them in their 40s, still form the elite of Soviet tennis, which is played mostly among the upper levels of the Red hierarchy in the few large cities that have decent courts. Soviet tennis equipment is scarce and far from first rate, and that from abroad, especially from Czechoslovakia, is in great demand.

After I fled the Soviet world the sports bureaucrats in Moscow announced that they had found a way of getting around all this by means of what they call malyy tennis (little tennis). Malyy tennis is played on a court smaller than a regular one with wooden rackets somewhat like ping-pong paddles and old worn-out tennis balls. The bulletin describing this supposed means of mass-producing Davis Cup material asserted: "It is true that tennis is a complicated sport form, but can we Soviet athletes use this as a justification for our lagging behind? It is not in the nature of the Soviet people to fear difficulties or to shrink before them. It is on this foundation that in our country we decide to surmount difficulties and to attain more new successes."

Ludicrous as all this may seem, it typifies the present Soviet attitude toward sports, in which any means, however farfetched, devious or plain, dishonest, is used toward the end of "world supremacy." Victory in next year's Olympics will mark the realization of that aim for the present.

As one who watched the Soviet preparations for the 1952 Olympics, I can assure you that not only the full resources of the great Soviet athletic training and recruiting system but also the full resources of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign intelligence system are now at work, and have been at work since 1952, to assure Soviet victory.

In the spring of 1952 our intelligence office in Tokyo received instructions from Moscow to collect all possible information on the strengths and weaknesses of local teams and athletes, and to "report on the honesty and quality of the managers, coaches and trainers of nationally known sports teams."

The implications of this last instruction were obvious. In 1948 I had a conversation with the coach of the Dynamo basketball team in which he admitted that the buying of foreign officials and judges was a routine part of Soviet sport strategy.

Spotting potentially corruptible officials is one of the jobs of the Committee of Sport's foreign section, which receives and evaluates all conceivable useful information on all athletic activities in every part of the world. If it discovers that a noted foreign team is having a rather weak

season, it will suggest a challenge to that team by a Soviet group with an almost sure chance of winning. If it discovers that a particular foreign country is getting ahead of the Soviet Union in a particular branch of sport, it recommends an intensive Soviet buildup in that branch. Finally it maintains complete control over the activities of Soviet athletes abroad, watching them for possible defections and giving them instructions for intelligence activities of their own among foreign athletes.

Between now and the 1956 Olympics we may expect to see more and more Soviet teams abroad winning more and more victories in such sports as skiing, gymnastics, marksmanship and track. We may expect to see Soviet athletes set new records as they have already set them in many sports. These same teans of rigidly controlled and highly paid "amateurs" will then appear at the Olympics.

At the 1952 Olympics the U.S. eked out a victory over the Soviet Union by $80\frac{1}{2}$ points. So unwilling to admit defeat was the Committee of Sport that a few days after the games closed, it issued an amazing pronouncement that "according to checked data," U.S. teams gained the same number of points as the Soviet Union. The Soviet press immediately took up this line, explaining the discrepancy by charging that the officials at the games had been "Wall Street capitalists" hirelings" and "filthy businessmen" who had deprived Soviet teams of honestly won victories.

Next year the Soviets are determined not to have to employ such sophistry.